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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
David Joseph Myers appeals in these consolidated cases from the district court’s orders
dismissing the charges against him without prejudice.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In an Amended Information that reflected the consolidation of two cases, the state
charged Myers with attempted strangulation, domestic battery with a traumatic injury, second
degree kidnapping, and two counts of aggravated assault. (R., vol. II, pp.45-48; see also Tr., p.2,
L.24 – p.3, L.12.) The state also alleged Myers was subject to sentence enhancements for having
used a deadly weapon in the commission of the aggravated assaults and kidnapping. (R., vol. II,
pp.49-51.) The district court set a trial date of January 23, 2018. (R., vol. I, p.36; R., vol. II,
p.44; Tr., p.1, L.19 – p.6, L.2.) At a pretrial conference on December 11, 2017, both parties
indicated the case would likely proceed to trial. (R., vol. II, p.44; Tr., p.1, L.19 – p.5, L.22.)
On the morning of trial, the state moved to dismiss both cases because the victim’s
whereabouts were unknown. (Tr., p.8, L.6 – p.9, L.8.) The prosecutor explained:
As [defense counsel] indicated the victim in this case she was in custody
with the Department of Corrections for most of the pendency of this case until
about three weeks ago at which point she was released to sober living. She was
instructed to live there and to remain there to check in and out. She checked out
the same day she checked in and disappeared.
A warrant is now outstanding, an agent’s warrant I believe from the
Department of Corrections, for her noncompliance with parole. We’ve done all
we can to try and contact her. We’ve been in contact with her mother. Her
mother has contact with the victim in this case, but even she won’t tell her mother
where she’s at because she knows if she’s picked up she’s going back to prison,
and she doesn’t want that to happen.
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When it became apparent to me that we weren’t going to be able to find
her in time for trial, I contacted [defense counsel] and offered what I believe was a
good offer in this case and let him know that if she isn’t picked back up we would
be dismissing the case, and we would move forward again if she’s picked up in
the future whenever that happens.
He rejected that offer. I believe I got an email from him Friday, and that
brings us to today, Judge. So that’s my intention.
(Tr., p.8, L.8 – p.9, L.8.)
Myers “object[ed] to a dismissal.” (Tr., p.7, Ls.21-25.) Defense counsel argued:
…. My understanding is that the witness, which I think is an essential
witness, is not legally required to be here because the state did not – it’s not like
they attempted to subpoena her. I have not heard that they attempted to subpoena
her, and they could have done that very easily.
So I think as Your Honor can see my client is in custody right now. He’s
been in custody for four months. This – the reason why the information is
convoluted today is because we proceeded to a prelim. The first set prelim the
witness did not show, and so my client was only bound over on half the charges.
She [the victim] was arrested and in custody, and they re-filed the second half, and
then we waived on that, and the cases were consolidated or joined or however it
got here today.
So the witness has already failed to appear once before while my client
was in custody. My client stayed in custody. This is the second time she’s failed
to appear on these charges and the state, my understanding, has made no attempt
to command her to be here today.
(Tr., p.12, L.21 – p.13, L.19.)
Defense counsel suggested a number of resolutions in lieu of the dismissal requested by
the state. First, counsel asked that the trial proceed as scheduled without the state’s “essential
witness.” (Tr., p.12, Ls.15-16, 22-24.) The court denied the request, noting there was “no jury”
because the court’s clerk had advised the court before that morning’s proceedings “that this was
going to be a change of plea or a dismissal.” (Tr., p.7, Ls.13-4, 18-19, p.12, Ls.15-18.) Counsel
next advised the court that Myers would “waive jury trial,” to which the court responded, “No.”
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(Tr., p.12, Ls.19-20.) Finally, “predicting” that the court would not dismiss the case with
prejudice, counsel “suggest[ed]” that the court enter an order releasing Myers on his own
recognizance, “but not dismiss the case and continue the jury trial” to a date within the speedy
trial period. (Tr., p.14, Ls.4-12.)
In response to counsel’s arguments and the court’s inquiry, the prosecutor advised the
court that the state had, in fact, attempted to subpoena the victim. (Tr., p.14, L.15 – p.15, L.9.)
Specifically, the prosecutor represented that, “on December 12th,” the state sent “a subpoena and
an Order of Transport” to the Ada County Jail, where the victim was incarcerated, but for reasons
that were unknown to the prosecutor “that was unable to be served.” (Tr., p.14, Ls.15-25; see
also R., vol. II, pp.52-56 (motion and order to transport).) The prosecutor reiterated that, since
that time, the victim had been released from custody and had “disappeared,” resulting in the
issuance of a felony warrant for her arrest.

(Tr., p.15, Ls.1-9.) The prosecutor was “not

opposed” to defense counsel’s request that Myers be released on his own recognizance and that
the trial be continued, but noted it was “possible” that the trial would have to be continued
beyond the speedy trial deadline, depending on when the victim “show[ed] back up.” (Tr., p.15,
Ls.11-14.)
Noting the cases were “within 30 days of speedy trial,” and finding it was the “cleanest”
resolution of the issues before it, the district court granted the state’s motion and ordered both
cases dismissed without prejudice. (Tr., p.15, L.15 – p.16, L.19; R., vol. I, pp.38-39; R., vol. II,
pp.62-63.) The court also ordered Myers released from custody and, as part of its orders,
“strongly suggest[e]d that if the case is refiled, the Defendant not be held on a substantial bond.”
(Tr., p.17, Ls.1-5; R., vol. I, p.38; R., vol. II, p.62.) Myers timely appealed from the district
court’s orders of dismissal. (R., vol. I, pp.41-44; R., vol. II, pp.64-67.)
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ISSUE
Myers states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the Court abused its discretion in dismissing the case.
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Myers failed to establish either that the district court abused its discretion by granting the
state’s motion for dismissal or that his remedy for the allegedly erroneous dismissal is a dismissal
of the cases with prejudice?
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ARGUMENT
Myers Has Failed To Establish Either That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Granting
The State’s Motion For Dismissal Or That Myers’ Remedy For The Allegedly Erroneous
Dismissal Is A Dismissal With Prejudice
A.

Introduction
Myers argues the district court abused its discretion by granting the state’s motion for

dismissal, claiming that “the State did not command its most important witness to attend the
trial” and that the court “agreed” to the dismissal “without inquiry or hearing from the Defense.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.8; see also p.6 (court “assented” to dismissal “without any opportunity for
defense input”).) Although Myers makes no claim that the state acted in bad faith, he requests as
a remedy for the allegedly erroneous dismissal that “this Court remand with instructions to enter
a dismissal with prejudice.” (Appellant’s brief, p.8.) Myers’ arguments fail; he has shown
neither an abuse of discretion nor entitlement to the remedy he seeks.

B.

Standard Of Review
The granting or denial of a motion to dismiss an information is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. I.C.R. 48; State v. Dixon, 140 Idaho 301, 304-05, 92 P.3d 551, 554-55 (Ct. App.
2004); State v. Keetch, 134 Idaho 327, 329-30, 1 P.3d 828, 830-31 (Ct. App. 2000). When a
trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multitiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.” State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citation
omitted).
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C.

Myers Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Dismissing The Charges Without Prejudice
A trial court’s authority to dismiss a criminal case is governed by I.C. § 19-3504 and

I.C.R. 48. Pursuant to the statute, the court may order a criminal action dismissed on the motion
of the prosecuting attorney if the dismissal is “in furtherance of justice.” I.C. § 19-3504.
Similarly, Rule 48 provides that the court may dismiss a criminal action for “any” reason if the
court determines that the dismissal will “serve the ends of justice and the effective administration
of the court’s business.” I.C.R. 48(a)(2). Pursuant to the rule, “[a]n order for dismissal is a bar
to any other prosecution for the same offense if it is a misdemeanor, but it is not a bar if the
offense is a felony.” I.C.R. 48(c); see also I.C. § 19-3506.
Although the district court in this case did not explicitly refer to I.C. § 19-3504 or I.C.R.
48, the court clearly perceived its decision on the state’s motion to dismiss Myers’ consolidated
criminal cases as one of discretion.

The court conducted a hearing on the motion, heard

argument from both parties, and ultimately concluded that a dismissal without prejudice was “the
cleanest way” to resolve the issue of the state’s missing witness. (Tr., p.7, L.4 – p.9, L.10, p.11,
L.25 – p.16, L.19.) In so concluding, the court rejected Myers’ attempts to force the state to trial,
with or without a jury, without what defense counsel himself characterized as an “essential”
state’s witness. (Tr., p.12, L.3 – p.13, L.3.) The court considered Myers’ alternative suggestion
that Myers be released from custody and that the trial be continued to another date within the
speedy trial deadline. (Tr., p.14, Ls.4-12, p.15, L.11 – p.16, L.1.) It noted, however, that the
speedy trial deadline was fast-approaching. (See Tr., p.15, L.23 – p.16, L.1 (“we’re within 30
days of speedy trial”).) Because there was no guarantee that the victim would resurface by the
speedy trial deadline, the court determined that the best course of action was to dismiss the cases
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without prejudice and order Myers’ release from custody. (Tr., p.15, L.11 – p.17, L.3.) Such
was not an abuse of discretion. By taking into account the state’s interest in not proceeding to
trial without an essential witness and Myers’ interests in having a speedy trial and not being
subject to oppressive pretrial incarceration, the court both reached its decision by an exercise of
reason and acted consistently with the legal standards that permitted it to dismiss the case for
“any” reason that “served the ends of justice and the effective administration of the court’s
business.” I.C.R. 48(a)(2); see also I.C. § 19-3504.
On appeal, Myers acknowledges that the state is generally “given wide latitude to dismiss
and refile felony charges.” (Appellant’s brief, p.8.) He also appears to concede that the state did
not act in bad faith in seeking dismissal of the charges in this case. (See Id. (citing State v.
Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 885, 136 P.3d 350, 356 (Ct. App. 2006), for proposition that “dismissal
and refiling of criminal complaints by the prosecutor, when done for the purpose of harassment,
delay, or forum shopping, can violate a defendant’s right to due process,” but noting such are not
“the facts in this case”).) He argues, however, that the district court abused its discretion by
granting the state’s motion to dismiss, contending (1) that the court “assented” or “agreed” to the
dismissal “without inquiry or hearing from the Defense” (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8), and (2) that
the victim’s “nonappearance on [the morning of trial] is solely attributable to the state”
(Appellant’s brief, p.7). Neither of Myers’ arguments withstand scrutiny and neither demonstrate
an abuse of discretion.
Myers’ claim that the district court “agreed” to dismiss the case “without any opportunity
for defense input” is premised on the fact that, at the outset of the proceedings on what was
supposed to be the morning of trial, the court announced: “I was advised that this was going to
be a change of plea or a dismissal.” (Tr., p.7, Ls.10-14; see also p.7, Ls.18-19 (“My clerk
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advised me that it was going to be a change of plea or dismissal.”), p.9, Ls.9-10 (“We didn’t
bring in a jury panel based on the information we had.”).) Myers extrapolates from the court’s
comments and the fact that it did not summon a jury panel that “[t]he Court made the decision to
dismiss the case prior to taking the bench, apparently based on a communication to which Myers
was not privy.” (Appellant’s brief, p.6.) But a review of the record plainly refutes this assertion.
After the court announced it had been advised that the case would not be going to trial,
defense counsel represented that the state had contacted him “last week” to advise him that its
“main witness’s whereabouts [were] unknown” and, during that conversation, defense counsel
“inform[ed] the state that [Myers] would object to a dismissal.” (Tr., p.7, L.20 – p.8, L.1; see
also p.8, L.24 – p.9, L.5 (prosecutor representing he conveyed intention to dismiss to defense
counsel in advance of trial).) Myers was thus fully aware before the morning of trial that, unless
Myers accepted the state’s plea offer, the state would be seeking to dismiss the charges. That the
prosecutor apparently made the same representation to the court’s clerk, who then relayed that
information to the district court, does not show any improper ex parte communication. Nor is
there any indication in the record that, relying on that communication, the court “made the
decision to dismiss the case prior to taking the bench.” (Appellant’s brief, p.6.) Although the
court did not “bring in a jury panel based on the information [it] had” (Tr., p.9, Ls.9-10), it is
clear that the court had not made a decision on a motion to dismiss that had not yet been made.
The court entertained the prosecution’s motion on the record, heard argument from both parties,
and expressly considered other options in lieu of dismissal, including Myers’ suggestion that the
trial be continued to a later date within the speedy trial deadline. (Tr., p.7, L.13 – p.9, L.10, p.11,
L.25 – p.16, L.19.) Because the record shows the court decided the motion only after “inquiry”
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and “hearing from the Defense” (see Appellant’s brief, p.8), Myers’ assertion that the court
abused its discretion by not doing so is without merit.
Myers has likewise failed to show the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the
case based on the fact that the victim—an “essential” state’s witness—was missing. Myers faults
the state for not subpoenaing the victim and appears to argue that, because the victim’s
“nonappearance” was “solely attributable to the state,” the district court should have forced the
state to proceed to a trial that, inevitably, would have resulted in an acquittal. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.7-8.) Myers’ argument fails for a number of reasons.
First, he has failed to cite any authority to support his claim that he was entitled to a trial
at which the state would be deprived of the testimony of its “most important witness” (see
Appellant’s brief, p.8) and, as such, has waived the issue on appeal. State v. Baxter, 163 Idaho
231, 235 n.4, 409 P.3d 811, 815 n.4 (2018) (claim of error is waived on appeal “if not supported
by any cogent argument or authority in [the] opening brief” (quotations omitted)).
Second, his claim that the victim’s “nonappearance” was “solely attributable to the state”
(Appellant’s brief, p.7) is dubious at best. The prosecutor represented at the hearing on the
motion to dismiss that the state had attempted to subpoena the victim while she was in the
custody of the Ada County Jail but, for reasons that were unknown to the prosecutor, that
subpoena was not served; that the state had been in contact with the victim until about three
weeks earlier, when she was “released to sober living”; that the victim “disappeared” from sober
living “the same day she checked in”; that the state had done “all [it] [could] to try and contact
her,” including contacting her mother; and that the victim would not even “tell her mother where
she[] [was] at” because she had “a felony warrant out for her arrest” and did not want to go “back
to prison.” (Tr., p.8, Ls.8-23, p.14, L.17 – p.15, L.9.) Thus, while the state did not successfully
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subpoena the victim, it clearly made attempts to secure her presence at the trial. While Myers
argues the state’s inability to do so was attributable “solely” to the absence of a subpoena
commanding the victim to attend the trial, the circumstances of the victim’s disappearance, as
outlined by the prosecutor, strongly suggest that the victim, who was on the lam, would not have
appeared at the trial even under the command of a subpoena.
Finally, even assuming that the state was negligent in not subpoenaing the victim and that
the absence of a subpoena was the reason the victim did not appear, the district court still acted
well within its discretion in dismissing the charges without prejudice rather than forcing the state
to go to trial without its essential witness. As previously noted, I.C.R. 48 (a)(2) provides that a
court may dismiss a criminal action for “any” reason if doing so “will serve the ends of justice
and the effective administration of the court’s business.” See also I.C. § 19-3504. The dismissal
of a felony prosecution without prejudice to permit the prosecution to cure difficulties in
obtaining the availability of witnesses is a dismissal “in furtherance of justice.” Cf. State v.
Goodmiller, 86 Idaho 233, 238-39, 386 P.2d 365, 367-68 (1963) (original information dismissed
on motion of prosecutor because a material witness was unavailable; court held that, because
information was dismissed “in furtherance of justice,” the dismissal was not a bar to another
prosecution). In fact, even in cases where the defendant’s speedy trial rights are implicated, the
remedy for the state’s failure to secure necessary witnesses—even when such failure does not
amount to “good cause” for continuance of the trial beyond the speedy trial deadline—is
dismissal of the case without prejudice, not a trial without the necessary witnesses. See I.C. §
19-3501(2) (where defendant is not brought to trial within six months of filing of information,
trial court must dismiss the prosecution “unless good cause to the contrary is shown”); I.C. § 193506 (order for dismissal under Title 19, Chapter 35 of Idaho Code is not a bar to prosecution for
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same offense if the offense is a felony); Goodmiller, 86 Idaho at 238-39, 386 P.2d at 367-68;
State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 841-43, 118 P.3d 160, 173-75 (2005) (absent showing of bad
faith, prosecutor’s negligence in failing to secure witnesses’ attendance at trial justified dismissal
of case without prejudice). A prosecutor may be barred from dismissing and re-filing criminal
charges if the prosecutor seeks the dismissal in bad faith (e.g., “for the purpose of harassment,
delay or forum-shopping”). Davis, 141 Idaho at 841-43, 118 P.3d at 173-75. But Myers has
never argued, and the district court did not find, any bad faith motive on the part of the state in
this case.
Certainly Myers would have preferred proceeding to trial with the state unable to present
the testimony of its most important witness, but Myers did not have a right to such a trial. The
district court recognized its decision as discretionary, acted within the bounds of its discretion
and consistently with the applicable legal standards, and exercised reason in granting the state’s
motion to dismiss the charges against Myers without prejudice.

Myers’ arguments to the

contrary are without merit.

D.

Even If The Court Abused Its Discretion By Granting The State’s Motion To Dismiss,
Myers’ Remedy Is Reinstatement Of The Charges For The Trial He Requested, Not A
Dismissal With Prejudice
In the “Conclusion” section of his Appellant’s brief, Myers asks this Court to “remand

with instructions to enter a dismissal without prejudice.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

Even

assuming the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the cases over Myers’ objection,
there are two reasons why Myers is not entitled to the remedy he seeks.
First, Myers never asked the district court that any dismissal of the charges be with
prejudice and, as such, failed to preserve that request for appeal. See, e.g., State v. Gonzalez, No.
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44534, 2019 WL 693765, at *4 (Idaho Feb. 20, 2019) (“[B]oth the issue and the party’s position
on the issue must be raised before the trial court for it to be properly preserved for appeal.”).
Below, Myers objected to the charges being dismissed at all, and he insisted that the cases
proceed to trial as scheduled. (Tr., p.7, L.10 – p.8, L.1, p.12, L.3 – p.13, L.19.) Alternatively, he
requested that he be released on his own recognizance and that the court reschedule the trial to a
later date within the speedy trial deadline. (Tr., p.14, Ls.4-12.) Because Myers never argued to
the district court that any dismissal should be with prejudice, his request on appeal for a
dismissal with prejudice is not properly before this Court.
Second, and more importantly, Myers’ request for a dismissal with prejudice fails on its
merits. As explained in the previous section, the district court’s order of dismissal fell within the
purview of Idaho Code § 19-3504 because it was a dismissal entered in “furtherance of justice.”
And Idaho Code § 19-3506 specifically provides that an order for dismissal of a criminal action
entered pursuant to I.C. § 19-3504 is not a bar to further prosecution if the offense is a felony.
Because the operative statutes expressly contemplate that any order granting a prosecuting
attorney’s motion to dismiss a felony prosecution be without prejudice, Myers’ bare request for a
dismissal with prejudice is unavailing.
There are exceptions to the general rule that a dismissal is not a bar to further prosecution
in felony cases. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that dismissal and re-filing of
charges can violate due process if “done for the purpose of harassment or delay or forumshopping ….” Stockwell v. State, 98 Idaho 797, 806, 573 P.2d 116, 125 (1977). But “Stockwell
requires the existence of bad faith to prove a per se due process violation.” State v. Bacon, 117
Idaho 679, 684, 791 P.2d 429, 434 (1990). Accord Averett, 142 Idaho at 885, 136 P.3d at 356.
“To warrant dismissal rather than a new trial on due process grounds, government conduct must
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be so grossly shocking and outrageous as to violate the universal sense of justice.” State v.
Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 45, 966 P.2d 33, 45 (Ct. App. 1998).
In this case, Myers has never alleged, and the district court did not find, that the state
acted in bad faith in seeking to dismiss the charges against him. To the contrary, Myers appears
to concede on appeal that the state’s conduct in seeking to dismiss the case based on the fact that
one of its essential witnesses was missing did not violate his right to due process.

(See

Appellant’s brief, p.8 (acknowledging cases involving violations of defendants’ due process
rights do not “approach the facts in this case”).) Although Myers complains the state was
negligent in not securing the witness’ attendance, that claim, even if true, does not establish any
violation of his rights to a fair trial. See Davis, 141 Idaho at 843, 118 P.3d at 175 (due process
not violated by “delay that was caused by conduct that was in good faith, but that was caused by
inadequate, ineffective, or insufficient personnel or management”). Because there was no bad
faith and no deliberate effort to prejudice the defense, Myers’ remedy for the allegedly erroneous
dismissal would be reinstatement of the charges and the trial he requested, not the windfall of
never having to face the charges at all.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order dismissing
Myers’ cases without prejudice.
DATED this 25th day of April, 2019.

/s/ Lori A. Fleming
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 25th day of April, 2019, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
GABRIEL J. McCARTHY
McCARTHY LAW, PLLC
efiling@gabrielmccarthy.com

/s/ Lori A. Fleming
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
LAF/dd
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